Capital Markets & Governance

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Robin believes a combined SpaceX–xAI listing is approaching, with ambitions for a trillion-dollar valuation. SpaceX reportedly has EBITDA of about US$8 billion. He subjectively assumes that depreciation, interest, taxes, and related items account for 60–80%, putting net income at about US$3 billion. With xAI still losing money, he expects the combination to be slightly profitable or slightly loss-making. To support a trillion-dollar market capitalization, he argues, Musk needs an even bigger narrative, including space-based computing centers and an enormous wafer-fab project. He also connects this with Tesla’s trillion-dollar compensation plan. Even assuming US$1 billion in earnings, the implied price-to-earnings ratio would exceed 1,000.

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The excerpts trace private equity’s ‘vulture’ reputation to deals such as KKR’s acquisition of RJR Nabisco, then present counterarguments: acquisitions by competitors often cause more job losses; private-equity-backed companies perform better after returning to public markets than other newly listed firms; and their bankruptcy rates are comparable with those of other companies. Robin adds Taiwanese examples—Fusheng, Nien Made, and Primax—and recalls participating in Fusheng’s return to the public market. He closes by hoping for more responsible capital markets that pay greater attention to labor, the environment, social issues, and diverse values, and contribute to sustainability.

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Robin discusses Silicon Valley 101, S3E89, which looks at falling technology stocks from Wall Street investors’ perspective. At the time covered by the episode, Meta’s shares fell about 20% as it insisted on investing in the metaverse, while Intel’s rose about 10% after it announced capital-spending cuts. Robin makes two observations. Wall Street investors often look less than a year ahead, whereas venture capitalists look three to five years ahead. In a strong economy, Wall Street can think long term like VC; when conditions reverse, VC can become more like Wall Street, emphasizing profitability, free cash flow, and survival.

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Robin observes that May and June are shareholder-meeting season, yet Taiwanese companies generally do not take the preparation of their operating reports—the counterpart to overseas shareholder letters—seriously enough. Leaders of great companies abroad value this annual opportunity to report directly to shareholders in writing. He argues that Taiwan still has a long way to go in corporate governance and can start by taking shareholder reporting more seriously. The closing excerpts describe good shareholder letters: treating readers as business partners, speaking candidly, and emphasizing long-term thinking.

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Robin notes that TSMC’s market capitalization was about 18.93 trillion, versus 6.18 trillion for 815 Taipei Exchange-listed companies combined—roughly three times as much. One company represented about 30% of exchange market value. He sees a power-law pattern, citing an early YC observation that its top investment returned more than investments two through two hundred combined. He outlines two views: diversify to reduce overconcentration and ‘Dutch disease,’ or focus scarce talent and resources on one globally competitive strength. He favors focus but worries about a generational technological shift making semiconductors suddenly less important, drawing an analogy with artificially produced spice in Dune.

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Robin briefly reviews the dot-com crash: NASDAQ peaked at 5,048.62 on March 10, 2000, and fell to 1,114.11 on October 9, 2002, a decline of roughly 78% over two and a half years. He says 95% of internet companies failed to survive that cycle, while survivors such as Amazon and Google had opportunities to become giants. He asks readers to assess their own resilience: could they last two years, tolerate a 70% unrealized investment loss, and cope with layoffs or mortgage pressures?

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On the day of a Taiwan Innovation Board forum, Robin considers the share-price performance and listing choices of Taiwanese NASDAQ-listed startups GGR and TNMG. A US listing brings challenges in attracting investors, higher listing and ongoing costs, and regulation. He personally suggests that only a sufficiently large venture addressing a substantial regional market, with a top-three position and strong growth, should challenge the US market. Others can use Taiwan’s capital markets. He contrasts the smallest Taipei Exchange-listed companies and relays a senior colleague’s estimate that maintaining a US listing costs at least an additional US$2–4 million annually.

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Robin refers to past fundraising scandals such as Hongyuan and explains his view that only designated institutions under specified legal frameworks may raise funds from the general public. He believes most countries have comparable rules. Banks, insurers, and public companies have laws and supervisors intended to protect depositors, policyholders, and retail investors. Not everyone may simply collect public funds; small fraudulent or pyramid schemes should face stricter oversight. Taiwan’s startups have many other financing channels, including angels, VC, CVC, incubators, and accelerators that can refine business models and connect founders with appropriate investors.

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Robin counts 2,243 companies on Taiwan’s main board, Taipei Exchange, and Emerging Stock Board as of August 31, 2025: 1,032, 855, and 356 respectively. That is roughly one for every 10,404 residents, potentially falling to one per 10,000 by year-end. He argues that becoming a Taipei Exchange-listed company is increasingly attainable: annual after-tax net profit of 30–50 million is around the middle range. The harder challenge is attracting sustained investor attention and investment after listing, with over 2,000 companies to choose from and alternatives including US stocks and cryptocurrencies.

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Using TNL Mediagene in October 2026, Robin questions the strategic direction of a Taiwan–Japan media group that merged, listed in the United States, and then agreed to sell its Japanese business. He compares its market capitalization, the transaction consideration, and DIGITIMES’ valuation, but the dates, exchange rates, and share-count bases have not been reconciled. The announced US$5.5 million is conditional total consideration including cash, debt treatment, and a note—not an immediate cash receipt of that amount. At announcement, the agreement still awaited closing. This article preserves the questions raised then, without drawing conclusions about valuation gaps or the future headquarters.

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Do not choose a listing venue solely for its prestige. Consider customer location, whether investors understand the company, and the fit among scale, liquidity, and cost. Using company examples through year-end 2023, the author explains how Taiwanese small and medium-sized businesses can use listing as a tool for their next growth stage.

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Silicon Valley has long emphasized believing before seeing, and much of Holmes’s defense revolved around that idea. But the distinction between ambition and fraud lies in details: sending tests to outside laboratories when machines do not work, and dressing claims with celebrity photographs and endorsements. Robin’s conclusion is that founders can have vision and ideals, but must not deceive, overpackage, or fabricate for investors who trust them.

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Overruns receive extra funding and failed projects are repackaged because someone else pays. Robin adds that budget and revenue achievement help identify responsible founders. The original date given for János Kornai’s soft budget constraint concept is incorrect; a verification note corrects it.

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Robin begins by describing Luckin as a textbook case. A Dedao Headlines compilation follows: after accounting fraud and delisting, Luckin completed a debt restructuring and pursued a turnaround through milk-based coffee products, franchising, and more targeted marketing.